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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: Abuse of discretion is the standard of review for 
considering a late-filed memorandum and the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it, for good cause, considered the 
memorandum. 
POINT II: NSI had standing under Utah Law. Norton cites federal 
standing law which is based on 'case or controversy'. Utah 
standing law is distinct from federal law and standing requirements 
are met by NSI. 
POINT III: The courts apply different standards to "containers" 
versus "component parts." A factual question exists as to whether 
Norton's pail and lid were a "container" or "component parts." 
This alone prevents a grant of summary judgment by the lower 
court. 
POINT IV: The evidence before the lower court raised a factual 
question about whether the product Norton manufactured was 
defective and therefore a grant of summary judgment was improper. 
POINT V: The container manufactured by Norton not only had the 
foreseeable use to hold liquids but it was intended for just such 
use. 
ARGUMENT 
Each of the following points directly corresponds to points in 
the brief of the appellee. 
POINT I: THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
CONSIDERING A LATE-FILED RESPONSE. 
Norton claims the lower court must grant Norton's motion, as 
unopposed, because the opposing memorandum was late. 
A. The proper standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
Norton claims that the lower court decided all issues, 
including this one, as a matter of law and that the trial court's 
2 
consideration of the late-filed memorandum should be reviewed for 
"correctness." (Norton brief at p. 2) That is incorrect. The 
lower court has discretion to consider a wide variety of 
information in its decision, including, for good cause, a late-
filed memorandum. This Court should overturn the lower court, only 
if the lower court's discretion is abused. Arevalo v. Department 
of Emp. See, 745 P.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1987). Under Norton's theory, 
any late memorandum opposing a motion would result in an automatic 
default. 
B. The lower court's discretion was not abused. 
Norton's motion was filed against the plaintiff and 
plaintiff's counsel stated he would oppose it. Plaintiff's counsel 
obtained an extension of time to file the opposing memorandum. Only 
when plaintiff's counsel declined at the last minute to file an 
opposing memorandum did co-defendant NSI file one. It was several 
days past the extended time, and several weeks past the original 
deadline. Plaintiff urged the Court to consider NSI's brief, 
feeling responsible for having stated he would file a response, and 
then not filing one. The Court considered the case on the merits, 
over Norton's objection. 
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The Court's agreement to consider the late-filed memorandum 
was not an abuse of discretion. It looked at all the facts 
surrounding the late filing, determined it was not jurisdictional 
but procedural, and for good cause considered the memorandum of 
defendant NSI. It was the appropriate decision under the 
circumstances. 
POINT II: NSI HAS STANDING. 
In Point II of its brief, Norton claims NSI does not have 
standing to pursue this appeal. In support of its contention, 
Norton cites three federal cases. The federal cases are irrelevant 
to standing in Utah state courts. 
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 
1986) is the landmark case on standing in Utah courts. In 
Terracor, the Supreme Court of Utah stated "unlike federal law 
where standing doctrine is related to the 'case or controversy' 
language of Article III of the United States Constitution, our 
standing law arises from the general precepts of the Doctrine of 
Separation of Powers found in Article V of the Utah Constitution." 
Terracor, supra at 798 (emphasis added) . Instead of looking to 
federal law, Terracor lays out the basis of standing in Utah. 
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Terracor first addresses the underpinnings of standing in Utah 
courts. The parties need "a sufficient interest" in the dispute 
that the issues will be "thoroughly explored." Standing is 
intended to assure that the Court deals with "crystallized disputes 
concerning specific factual situations." Because of this, it is 
generally required ". . . that a litigant have a personal stake in 
the outcome of the specific dispute." Standing ". . . often 
depends on the facts of each case." See Terracor, Supra at 798, 
799. 
Terracor laid out three criteria, any one of which may give a 
litigant standing. These three are addressed below: 
A. Personal stake in litigation constitutes standing. 
"Plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome of the legal dispute." Terracor, Supra at 799. NSI 
clearly meets that criteria in the present suit. NSI had the right 
for a jury to determine Norton's fault.1 NSI's right was abrogated 
lnThe trial court . . . shall, direct the jury, if any, to find 
separate special verdicts determining the total amount . . . of 
fault attributable to each . . . defendant," Utah Code Ann. §78-
27-39. "Defendant means a person . . . who is claimed to be liable 
because of fault to any person seeking recovery." (Utah Code Anno. 
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when plaintiff declined to resist Norton's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the Court ruled that Norton's name would not be 
included on the jury verdict form. 
The real basis of this appeal is the lower court's ruling that 
Norton's fault would not be determined. In the lower court, NSI 
maintained that it did not object to Norton receiving summary 
judgment, as long as Norton's fault was determined by the jury. 
(R. p. 281, 1. 5). Under Sullivan v. Scoular Grain, 853 P.2d 877, 
a party who is not at fault, as a matter of law, does not have its 
fault determined by the jury. This case, however, is similar to a 
party being dismissed for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff 
never even filed an opposition to Norton's motion for summary 
judgment, evidently realizing that, as long as the Court would not 
allow Norton's name on the jury verdict, it was easier for 
plaintiff to prosecute the case against one defendant, NSI. (See 
brief of appellant, p. 41) 
When the Court ruled Norton's fault would not be determined by 
the jury, a critical interest of NSI was affected. Fault on a jury 
§78-27-37(1)). 
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verdict must equal 100%, and NSI would end up paying for Norton's 
proportionate fault. 
NSI settled when it became obvious that expert and attorney's 
fees would likely exceed the proposed settlement. NSI urged 
plaintiff to pursue an appeal against Norton, but plaintiff 
declined, maintaining the Court had already ruled. NSI has paid a 
six figure settlement, and wants Norton's proportionate fault 
determined, maintaining that most or all of the fault is Norton's. 
This is clearly a 'crystallized dispute concerning a specific 
factual situation' with NSI having a 'personal stake in the 
outcome' as required by Terracor. 
B. Greatest Interest in case constitutes standing. 
A second alternative basis of standing is when n. . .no one 
else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and the 
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular 
plaintiff has standing to raise the issue." (Terracor, Supra at 
799) NSI also has standing under this criteria. The plaintiff 
below has settled, and agreed to assist NSI in pursuing the case 
against Norton (See Addendum 1, the settlement agreement). These 
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless NSI has standing. 
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Norton's federal theory of standing would compel NSI to 1) try the 
case no matter how reasonable a settlement is offered in order to 
preserve standing; and 2) make cross claims compulsory, although 
under the Utah rules of civil procedure cross claims are clearly 
permissive.2 NSI has the greatest interest in the outcome of this 
case and these issues will not be addressed otherwise. 
C. Unique issues of public interest constitute standing. 
A third criteria which will grant standing is ". . .if the 
issues are unique and of such great public importance that they 
ought to be decided in furtherance of the public interest." 
2Cross claims are clearly permissive, not compulsory. Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) governs "Cross-claim against co-
party." It states "A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim 
by one party against a co-party . . . such cross-claim may include 
a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be 
liable to the cross claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in 
the action against the cross claimant" (emphasis added). The rule 
clearly states that cross claims "may" be brought. This rule 
contrasts with rule 13 (a) which is entitled "Compulsory 
counterclaims", which uses the word "shall" instead of "may." 
Moore's Federal Practice (the Federal and State rules on cross 
claims are the same) states "The subdivision [on cross claims], 
though reading much like subdivision (a) concerning compulsory 
counterclaim, is permissive: the claim may, but need not, be 
pleaded." Moore's Federal Practice §13.34[1]. (Emphasis in 
original). Since a cross claim is permissive, it is not waived if 
not filed in the original suit. (See Norton's motion and NSI's 
response, Addendum 2 and 3.) 
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Terracor, Supra at 799. The present case also meets this 
requirement. Under Norton's theory, the Tort Reform Act has 
allowed a plaintiff, as NSI maintains occurred in this case, to 
select one of multiple defendants against which to prosecute a 
case. That defendant can be chosen because of a more simple case, 
easier access to witnesses or any other criteria. Plaintiff can 
then allow the other defendants to bring motions for summary 
judgment, which plaintiff declines to resist, as occurred here. 
Norton maintains, and the lower court ruled, that such a dismissal 
is "on the merits" and precludes the defendant's fault being 
proportioned by the jury. This Court should consider the 
alternatives to this unfairness to further the public interest in 
future cases. 
Norton ignores Utah's standing law because it grants NSI 
standing. The underlying basis of a "personal stake" in the 
outcome of a "specific factual situation" is met here. Norton 
instead cites federal law, based on entirely different 
underpinnings. The federal law is irrelevant to this case. NSI 
has standing under the criteria set forth in Terracor. 
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POINT III: THERE IS, AT LEAST, A FACTUAL QUESTION AS TO 
WHETHER NORTON'S PAIL AND LID WERE "COMPONENT 
PARTS." 
Norton argues that "The lower court correctly held that Norton 
manufactured only 'component parts' with which containers could be 
assembled." (Norton brief at p. 9) 
A. A factual question exists, at least, as to whether Norton's two 
products, a pail and a lid, were "component parts" or a 
"container." 
"Norton did not sell a 'container' to NSIf but components with 
which NSI constructed a container." (Norton brief at p. 11). 
Norton's "component parts" consisted of two items, a pail and a lid 
which Norton had manufactured specifically to seal the pail. 
Norton claims these are "component parts", a term of art referring 
to an inconsequential component which is unforeseeably incorporated 
into a much more complex piece of machinery, designed and 
manufactured by another. 
Norton tries to distinguish NSI's "container" cases, cited in 
the appellant's brief, by claiming they do not address "component 
part" law. Of course the container cases do not discuss "component 
parts." Neither do they address statute of limitations or other 
law that is not relevant to the case. What they do address is 
10 
"container" law. A manufacturer of a container, including Norton, 
is liable for the foreseeable uses of its container. Here, NSI's 
use of Norton's container to ship soap was not only foreseeable, it 
was anticipated. 
Van Duzer v. Shoshone Coca Cola Bottling, 714 P.2d 812 (Nev. 
1987) overruled a jury verdict for the defendant and found, as a 
matter of law, that UA product container that cannot withstand the 
rigors of normal shipping practices is unreasonably dangerous and, 
by definition, defective." Id., at 813. The same should be said 
for Norton's container which could not withstand normal opening 
practices in foreseeable elevations and temperatures. 
Norton claims That ". . . Van Duzer involved a glass Canada Dry 
Bottle not constructed of any component parts" (Norton Brief at 
11) . The Court can take judicial notice that Van Duzer also 
involved a container and a lid. If the container manufacturer 
sealed the lid in place, there would be no means of inserting the 
contents into the container. 
Norton's attempts to distinguish the container cases 
referenced by NSI, are conclusory - not based on differences in the 
cases. Norton's container and lid are clearly analogous to the 
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"container" cases, and are not the "component parts", incorporated 
into an unforeseeable product, as the lower court ruled. 
POINT IV: THERE IS A FACTUAL QUESTION, AT LEAST, AS TO WHETHER 
NORTON'S CONTAINER WAS DEFECTIVE. 
Norton claims NSI has misconstrued the lower court's ruling 
that " . . . Norton did not have a duty to Warn." (Summary Judgment 
at p. 4, Paragraph 1). Norton argues: "Rather, the court 
correctly held that Norton's components in fact were not defective, 
and Norton therefore had no duty to warn plaintiff of dangers which 
might arise through another company's use of its components." 
(Norton Brief at 12) 
This section of Norton's brief, like others, is dependant on 
the correctness of Norton's claim of being a "component part" 
manufacturer. If Norton is not, as a matter of law, a "component 
parts" manufacture, the lower court's ruling regarding Norton's 
duty and whether the container was defective, however construed, 
also fails. 
Norton has ignored the factual issues raised in NSI's 
appellant brief. NSI's appellant brief, on pages 28 to 35, 
discussed, with citations: 
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1. That whether a defendant has breached a duty is ordinarily 
"a question of fact for the jury" (See brief of appellant at p. 
28) ; 
2. That the plaintiff created a factual issue of 
defectiveness when he testified that he followed the "pry out" 
instructions imprinted on Norton's container before it was shipped 
to NSI (See brief of appellant at p. 29); 
3. That Dr. de Nevers created a factual question of 
defectiveness when he testified that the pressure in Norton's 
container could propel Norton's seal at up to 160 mph, and that 
NSI's soap did not create the pressure in Norton's container, but 
was created by normal altitude and temperature differences (See 
brief of appellant at pp. 3 0-32); 
4. That Norton's owner created a factual question of 
defectiveness when he acknowledged he was aware altitude and 
temperature differences would create pressure in Norton containers 
(See brief of appellant at p. 23); and 
5. That Dr. Fineman created a factual question of 
defectiveness when he testified that ". . . as a chemist . . . 
13 
there is no basis what-so-ever for pressure build up in this 
product" (See brief of appellant at p. 34). 
These facts raised by NSI in appellant's brief are not 
responded to by Norton.3 Norton ignores those facts and instead 
cites the lower court's conclusory language that no expert stated 
the container was "defective," and that Norton ". . . did not 
manufacture the container. . . . " but only its "component parts." 
This circuitous reasoning does not avoid the factual issues created 
by witnesses, and cited in NSI's appellant's brief. Norton 
erroneously tries to avoid the factual testimony in the case by 
claiming no duty because it was not the manufacturer of the 
container. Summary judgment, an unusual and harsh remedy, is 
simply wrong. 
POINT V: NORTON IS NOT A "COMPONENT PARTS'' MANUFACTURER. 
In Point V., Norton returns to its central claim, that it had 
no duty as a "component part" manufacturer. 
3Norton discusses the Court's holding that Norton's container 
was not defective on pages 12 and 13 of appellee's brief. 
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Norton claims it ". . . had no duty to anticipate how its component 
parts might be assembled by others into final products . . . ." 
(Norton Brief p. 14). 
The key to whether a product is a "component part" is whether 
its use is foreseeable. Norton's claim that, as a matter of law, 
it could not foresee that Norton's container, shipped to NSI with 
a Norton lid, would be filled with a liquid and the lid sealed to 
the container, defy all logic. Norton's claim of similarity with 
Sperry v. Bauermeister, Inc., 786 F.Supp. 1512 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (a 
small airlock incorporated into a milling system which was designed 
and manufactured by another company) and Miller v. E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours, 811 F.Supp. 1286 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (A Du Pont fiber that 
was combined with other ingredients in a patented process, to make 
a replacement joint for the human body) is clearly misplaced. 
Norton designed and manufactured its container and lid with the 
specific intent they be used, together, to hold liquids. (See 
Statement of Facts, NSI appellant brief, Page 8-9, facts 1-5). 
Norton designed and manufactured a container and lid that were 
being used for their intended purpose. Norton tries to escape a 
determination of its fault by a jury in claiming, as a matter of 
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law, that it had no duty to anticipate how its container and lid 
might be used. That itself is a factual issue. Under these 
circumstances it is clear that Norton manufactured a container and 
a trial is necessary to determine Norton's fault. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in applying, as a matter of law, the 
"component parts" law to Norton's container. NSI's use of the 
container, as a container, was not only foreseeable to Norton, but 
anticipated. 
This case should be remanded to the lower court for a 
determination of Norton's fault because either a) the lower court 
improperly granted the summary judgment; and/or b) plaintiff 
declined to resist the motion in good faith. 
DATED this 26th day of June, 1995. 
POWELL & LANG, LC 
Todd S. Wii^egar v 
Wade S. Winegar 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of June, 1995 I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Paul M. Belnap 
Robert L. Janicki 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for the defendant/appellee 
B.W. Norton Manufacturing 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
\,XJ , $ UU; 
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ADDENDUM 1 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS 
For and in consideration of the payment to the undersigned of 
the total sum of One Hundred Twelve Thousand Dollars ($112,000.00), 
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned, Sherman 
D. Packer, hereby forever releases and discharges National Service 
Industries, Inc., ZEP Manufacturing Company, their related 
companies, employees, agents, and assigns (the "Releasees"), from 
any and all claims, demands, benefits either past or future, causes 
of action both for property damages, bodily injuries, contribution 
and indemnity, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses, or 
compensation in any form on account of, in any way arising out of, 
or related to the incident which occurred on or about the 10th day 
of June, 1991, at Sandy, Utah, except as noted in the penultimate 
paragraph of this release. 
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the 
injuries sustained by him are or may be permanent and progressive 
and that recovery therefrom may be uncertain and indefinite and in 
making this release and agreement it is understood and agreed that 
the undersigned relies wholly upon his own judgment, belief and 
knov/ledge of the nature, extent and duration of said injuries, and 
in granting this complete release, he does not rely upon anything 
told him or represented to him by the persons, firms or 
corporations who are being released, or by any person representing 
them. Particularly, the undersigned releases the persons and 
companies referred to above from the cause of action as set forth 
in the certain complaint on file in the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Sherman D. Packer is 
plaintiff and National Service Industries, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation, and others, are defendants, Civil No. 920902466CV. 
The undersigned hereby consents to stipulate to a dismissal with 
prejudice upon the merits of the above named action as against 
National Service Industries and ZEP Manufacturing Company only, and 
hereby authorizes his counsel to enter into such stipulation of 
dismissal. 
The undersigned understands and agrees that this settlement is 
a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that payment is 
not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the 
persons or companies referred to above who are released herein and 
by whom liability is expressly denied. 
The undersigned further acknowledges and accepts the advice of 
counsel in the settlement of this matter and acknowledges that this 
is a full, complete and final release of the releasees for any 
matter or thing done or alleged to have been done as a result of 
the incident referred to above whether or not now known, claimed or 
suspected by the undersigned. The undersigned further represents 
that he has not sold or assigned any portion of his claim against 
releasees and agrees that if any claim related to this incident 
should be made, including claims for indemnity or contribution, the 
undersigned will defend, indemnify and save harmless the parties 
being released herein. The undersigned represents that there are 
no liens on any of the proceeds of this settlement, that all 
medicals and other special damages have been paid in full, without 
possibility of lien or subrogation. The undersigned covenants that 
he will not maintain or prosecute any action or other proceeding, 
whether by way of complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party 
claim, or otherwise, against the releasees which are based upon or 
arise out of any facts, acts or omissions occurring or existing at 
any time up until the date of this release, whether the claim is 
based on contract, tort, statute, contribution, indemnity, equity 
or otherwise, and that this release may be plead as a full and 
complete defense to any such action or suit arising out of the June 
10, 1991, incident. 
This release covers all of the undersigned's costs, expenses, 
and attorney's fees and this release constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties and the undersigned waives any right 
he may have to refer to extrinsic matters in the interpretation 
hereof whether to establish fraud, duress, mistake, undue influence 
or for any other purpose. 
As part of the consideration for this settlement, plaintiff 
agrees to cooperate with releasees in pursuing claims against other 
parties, including the other named defendants in the above case, 
which parties are not released by this document. All claims will 
be pursued at the sole expense of the releasees, and ail settlement 
or judgment proceeds will belong to releasees, the plaintiff having 
been fully compensated for his loss. The undersigned agrees to 
cooperate fully, including being deposed, assigning any claims or 
proceeds, signing settlement documents and releases, meeting with 
counsel and otherwise assisting in pursuing any claims related to 
plaintiffs injury. 
The undersigned represents that he has carefully read the 
foregoing release of all claims, knows the contents thereof and 
signs the same by his own free act hereby binding himself, his 
heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, and assigns. 
DATED this V aay of Xfl / \ , 1994. 
Sherman D. Packer 
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STATE OF UTAH 
7 * 
:OUNTY OF,- JLI 
ss. 
-) 
A> SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
i u X , 1 9 9 4 
day ol 
f p n p ' i C i o 
Sa" LaWo CW) 
.WVJ.3 
I Life T - * e r 
Utan e O U 
: / M/Commi ssion Expires June 3. 19*6 
STATE OF UTAH 
/ ' / 
/ 
Notary P u b l i c 
•r\ 
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ADDENDUM 2 
RECEIVED 
APR ? b m$ 
Powell & Ung, LC 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
Robert L. Janicki, #5493 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Co, 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, INC., a California 
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL 
MACHINE AND TOOL WORKS, INC., 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANT B.W. NORTON'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No. 950900951CV 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company ("B.W. Norton"), 
by and through counsel of record, hereby submits the following 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion to 
dismiss. 
FACTS 
1. The instant action filed by plaintiff National Service 
Industries, Inc. (NSI) arises out of a prior lawsuit filed by 
Sherman D. Packer ("Packer") v. NSI, B.W. Norton, and International 
.'OW.Unh 
Machine and Tool Works ("International"). [See Complaint attached 
hereto as Exhibit A.] Defendants NSI and B.W. Norton answered and 
defended the allegations asserted by Mr. Packer in the underlying 
action. Although named, International was never served with 
process. [See Amended Complaint in the Packer action attached 
hereto as Exhibit B.] 
2. Packer alleged that on October 7, 1988, he purchased four 
products from NSI, one of those products being NSI's high foam 
degreaser. Packer further alleged that the high foam degreaser was 
packaged in a 7-gallon metal can manufactured by B.W. Norton with 
a pour spout and lid manufactured by defendant International. 
[Packer Amended Complaint, para. 7.] 
3. Packer claimed that the metal container contained a metal 
pour spout with a lid that indicated that one was to "pry out" the 
metal lid to open the container. Packer alleged that as he 
attempted to do so, the small metal lid suddenly exploded outward, 
striking him in the right eye. [Packer Amended Complaint, paras. 
8 and 9.] 
4. Packer then sought recovery from defendants B.W. Norton 
and NSI based upon strict liability, breach of warranty, and 
negligence. [See Packer Amended Complaint generally.] 
5. Defendant NSI did not file a cross-claim against 
defendant B.W. Norton. 
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6. Defendant B.W. Norton filed a motion for summary judgment 
asserting that there was no evidence that the products manufactured 
or supplied by B.W, Norton to NSI were defective. Packer did not 
oppose the motion. However, NSI did submit an opposition 
memorandum. The trial court, after hearing oral argument and 
considering the memoranda, granted B.W. Norton's motion for summary 
judgment. [See Order attached hereto as Exhibit C ] 
7. After defendant B.W. Norton was dismissed from the 
action, defendant NSI settled the case. 
8. Defendant NSI has appealed the trial court's granting of 
B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment in the underlying action. 
The appeal is currently in the briefing stage. 
INTRODUCTION 
In its appeal of the underlying action, defendant NSI is 
asserting that the trial court improperly granted B.W. Norton's 
motion for summary judgment. Defendant NSI argues that because the 
trial court granted B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment, NSI 
was somehow forced to settle the Packer action and was held 
responsible for more than its proportionate share of fault. 
However, NSI never filed a cross-claim against B.W. Norton in the 
underlying action. Had NSI filed a cross-claim against B.W. 
Norton, then NSI would have had standing to contest B.W. Norton's 
motion for summary judgment. If NSI had filed a cross-claim, and 
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the court had granted B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment, 
NSI could have requested that that judgment be certified as final 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. If 
the court certified the judgment as final, defendant NSI then would 
have been able to seek appellate review of the decision prior to 
trial. If the trial court had denied the Rule 54(b) certification, 
then NSI would have been required to take the case to trial. If 
NSI lost at trial, then at that time it would have been free to 
appeal the granting of B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment. 
If NSI was successful on appeal, the case would be remanded for a 
new trial. This is the procedure that NSI should have followed in 
the underlying action in order to preserve any claims it allegedly 
had against B.W. Norton. However, NSI did not follow this 
procedure. 
In the instant action, defendant NSI is merely requesting that 
the court permit it to recover from B.W. Norton a portion of the 
settlement it paid to Packer in the underlying action. This is 
nothing more than an action for contribution which was expressly 
abolished by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40. Therefore, NSI's complaint 
should be dismissed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NSI'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
A. First Cause of Action (Tort Reform Act, Proportionate Fault) 
In its first cause of action, plaintiff NSI argues that 
defendant B.W. Norton's fault should be determined pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-37 et seq. Apparently, NSI is arguing that this 
court should determine the "percentage" of fault attributable to 
B.W. Norton in the underlying Packer action. However, it is 
crystal clear that even if this court were to determine that B.W. 
Norton was in some way at fault, NSI is not entitled to 
contribution from B.W. Norton in respect to the settlement paid to 
the plaintiff in the underlying action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 
provides: 
Section 78-27-40. Amount of Liability Limited 
to Proportion of Fault — No Contribution. 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum 
amount for which a defendant may be liable to 
any person seeking recovery is that percentage 
or proportion of the damages equivalent to the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. No defendant is entitled 
to contribution from any other person. 
[Emphasis added] 
In the underlying action, defendant NSJ chose to settle the 
claims that plaintiff Sherman Packer v/as asserting. In reaching 
that settlement, NSI was not required to pay more than its 
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proportionate share of fault. The fact that NSI now believes that 
it paid more than its proportionate share of fault in reaching its 
settlement with Packer does not operate to somehow give NSI a right 
to contribution from B.W. Norton when contribution has been 
expressly abolished by statute. 
B. Third Cause of Action (Breach of Warranty) and Fourth Cause of 
Action (Strict Liability) 
In plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action, plaintiff 
has alleged breach of warranty and strict liability. However, it 
is clear that the damages sustained by NSI constitute the amount 
that defendant NSI was required to pay in settlement in the 
underlying action. Defendant NSI was not injured or damaged apart 
from the amount that it paid in settlement. Therefore, both these 
causes of action seek reimbursement from B.W. Norton for a portion 
of the settlement paid by NSI in the underlying action. As stated 
previously, defendant NSI is not entitled to contribution pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant NSI is currently pursuing two avenues in its attempt 
to recover from B.W. Norton a portion of the amount that it paid in 
settlement of the Packer action. First, NSI has appealed the 
granting of B.W. Norton's motion for summary judgment in the under-
lying action. That appeal is now in the briefing stage. In an 
alternative attempt to recover a portion of the settlement 
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proceeds, NSI has filed the instant action against B.W. Norton. 
The instant action is nothing more than an attempt to recover 
contribution from a co-defendant and is thus expressly barred by 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40. Therefore, defendant B.W. Norton 
requests that this court grant its motion to dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
DATED this <?J) day of 0Off^X/x^ , 1995 
PAul M. Belnap ' 
Robert L. Janicki 
Attorneys for Defendant 
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Co, 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, this _P 5 - day 
of C l-Q4 M , 1995, to the following: 
Todd S. Winegar 
Wade S. Winegar 
POWELL & LANG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
110 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Todd S. Winegar, 3 521 
Wade S. Winegar, 5561 
POWELL & LANG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff National 
Service Industries, Inc. 
110 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-0412 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATIONAL SERVICE, 
INDUSTRIES, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, INC., a California 
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL 
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS, INC., 
an Illinois corporation, 
Defendants. 
National Service Industries ("NSI") files this memorandum in opposition to defendant 
Norton's motion to dismiss NSFs complaint for failure to state a claim. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In considering a motion to dismiss, "The facts of the complaint are to be liberally construed 
and the court must consider all the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff" Anderson v. Dean Witter, 841 P2d 742 at 743 (Ut. App. 1992). The 
National Service Industries 
Response to Norton's Motion 
to Dismiss 
Civil No. 950900951CV 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
1 
complaint is to be dismissed only if, construing all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
there appears to be no set of fact under which plaintiff could recover. Anderson, supra. 
Factual Background 
A container, manufactured by defendant Norton, was sold to NSI. NSI made no alteration 
to Norton's container. NSI filled the container with soap, and sold it to Sherman Packer. Packer, 
while following the instructions which were imprinted on the seal before it was sold to NSI, was 
struck in the eye with the container's seal, functionally blinding Packer. The container was 
pressurized by altitude and temperature changes, not by the soap it contained. If a more complete 
background is desired by the Court, it is attached as Exhibit 1. 
The facts stated by defendant Norton are substantially accurate. The critical fact in defendant 
Norton's memorandum is fact "5", which states that NSI did not file a cross claim against Norton. 
It is accurate that neither defendant filed a cross claim against the other. That fact, and Norton's 
memorandum presume, however, without citation to any authority, that cross claims are compulsory, 
and are waived if not filed. As detailed below, cross claims are clearly permissive, not compulsory. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant Norton's motion fails for two reasons. 
1. It is the wrong motion. The complaint clearly states three causes of action- negligence, 
strict liability, and breach of warranty. Norton complains that there was a prior suit involving these 
actions and these parties. The proper motion to raise a prior suit is a motion based on "res judicata." 
not "failure to state a claim." Norton does not raise res judicata, however, presumably because it 
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must acknowledge that res judicata does not apply here since the issues were never "fully and fairy 
litigated," as res judicata requires. 
2. Defendant Norton's entire argument hinges on cross claims being compulsory. U.R.C.P. 
13(f), and also the comentators, make clear that cross claims are permissive. Since cross claims are 
permissive, there is no waiver of a cross claim for declining to file it. 
POINT I: RES JUDICATA IS THE BODY OF LAW THAT DECIDES IF A PRIOR 
LAWSUIT BARS A SUBSEQUENT ACTION 
Norton has not raised res judicata and so its details need not be reviewed. Suffice it to say 
that there is a large body of law, under res judicata, that prevents duplicate litigation. Norton's main 
arguement is that it received summary judgment in a previous suit where the same accident was at 
issue. Norton attaches its summary judgment to its memorandum. The summary judgment deals 
with the claims of Sherman Packer, not NSI. Norton's claim that the previous summary judgment 
should affect this suit is governed by the law of res judicata. Norton ignores that body of law 
becuase it does not support dismisal. 
POINT II. CROSS CLAIMS BETWEEN DEFENDANTS ARE NOT COMPULSORY. 
A. Norton's Claim. 
Norton cites as fact number 5, "Defendant NSI did not file a cross claim against defendant 
B.W. Norton." It is accurate that neither defendant filed a cross claim against the other. Norton's 
entire argument presumes, without citation to any authority, that cross claims are compulsory and 
that failing to file the 'compulsory' cross claim means the cross claim can not be brought later. 
B. Cross claims are clearly permissive. 
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Cross claims are clearly permissive, not compullsory. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) 
governs "Cross-claim against co-party." It states "A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim 
by one party against a co-party . . . such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom 
it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action 
against the cross claimant" (emphasis added). The rule clearly states that cross claims "may" be 
brought. This rule contrasts with rule 13(a) which is entitled "Compulsory counterclaims", which 
uses the word "shall" instead of "may". 
Moore's Federal Practice (the Federal and State rules on cross clafrns are the same) states 
"The subdivision [on cross claims], though reading much like subdivision (a) concerning 
compulsory counterclaim, is permissive: the claim may, but need not, be pleaded." Moore's Federal 
Practice §13.34[1]. (Emphasis in original). Since a cross claim is permissive, it is not waived if not 
filed in the original suit. 
C. Norton Argues That NSI Has No Current Claim Since It Did Not File A Cross Claim. 
Nortons' argument hinges on cross claims being compulsory. It is certain, that at some 
point, Norton's fault must be determined. Norton claims that the only time, regarding this accident, 
that Norton's fault could have been determined, is by NSI filing a cross claim in the first suit. 
1. Norton argues that since NSI did not file a cross claim in the first suit, NSI had 
no standing to oppose Norton's original motion for summary judgment against Packer, nor standing 
to appeal the grant of summary judgment. This is Norton's position on the appeal. 
2. Norton argues that the present suit does not state a claim. 
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3. Norton claims that, since no cross claim was filed in the first suit, Norton's fault 
can never be determined, and no court can now make Norton pay its proportionate share of fault. 
D. Norton's Compulsory Cross Claim Theory Leads To Absurd Results. 
(1) It shifts the burden of proof and allows a plaintiff to "dismiss" a defendant. 
Consider the following example, which, NSI maintains, substantially occurred between the 
present parties. A plaintiff sues three defendants, each of which, for argument sake, is one-third 
liable for plaintiffs injury. Plaintiff serves two of the defendants, but finds service on the third 
difficult so decides not to serve the third. 
The plaintiff decides that the case against one of the two defendants it has served is easier 
to make than the case against the other. This could be for a number of reasons: one defendant has 
a better witness; a deeper pocket; less aggressive counsel; more complete records; a deceased 
witness, etc. 
Plaintiff, under Norton's theory, merely targets one defendant and allows the other defendant 
to move for summary judgment. Plaintiff does not resist the motion for summary judgment. The 
Court, faced with an unresisted motion, would almost certainly grant it. Norton maintains that since 
the co-defendants had not filed permissive cross claims, they could not resist the other co-
defendant's motion. 
The plaintiff effectively dismisses one defendant, and forces the remaining defendants to pay 
the dismissed defendants share of fault (since the dismissed defendant's fault is not determined by 
the jury.) The same inequity results if the case is settle. The plaintiff, who can go to trial and 
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receive all of the dismissed defendants damages, will require those damages to settle. The likely 
result is the remaining defendant, who is only one third liable, would pay the dismissed defendants 
share of damages. 
Norton claims the court is helpless to remedy this situation, because the remaining defendant, 
here NSI, brought this dilemma on itself by failing to file a permissive cross claim. 
(2) Norton's argument that cross claims should be compulsory does not remedy the situation. 
Norton's desire to make cross claims 'compulsory' does not remedy the situation. In 
Norton's introduction on page 3, it begins five statements with "if." Norton's scenario is that " i f 
a cross claim had been filed, Rule 54(b) certification would possibly have given NSI an appeal on 
which it had standing to appeal. If not, " . . . then NSI would have been required to take the case to 
trial." Norton's memorandum, page 4 (emphasis added). Under Norton's theory, settlement waives 
the defendant's claims under these circumstances. After a string of "if s" Norton identifies NSI's 
final remedy would then be a second trial. Norton's theory is not only legally unsupported, but 
unworkable. 
(3) Norton's claim that failure to file a permissive cross claim leaves the co-defendant 
without remedy, violates constitution rights. 
Norton has cited no law that cross claims are compulsory and has cited no reasons that 
'compulsory' cross claims would be either fair or efficient. Additionally, Norton's claim of no 
remedy, if followed by this court, would result in the deprivation of constitutional rights, including 
a denial of due process (United States Constitution, 5th amendment; Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
Section 7), and the open courts provision in Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
6 
"The open courts provision guarantees 'access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is 
based on fairness and equality,' and prevents arbitrary deprivation of 'effective remedies designed 
to protect basic individual rights."' Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, at (Ut. App. 1993) quoting 
Berry ex rel Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P2d 670, (Ut. 1985). 
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are the very 
heart of procedural fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). Norton's fault 
must be determined, and the right to have it determined cannot be waived by failing to file a 
permissive cross claim. Under the circumstances of this case, Norton's proportionate fault needs 
to be determined here, or due process and the open courts provision are violated. 
E. SUMMARY 
Norton argues that its unresisted motion for summary judgment in the first suit cannot be 
contested or appealed by a co-defendant. Norton argues here that a co-defendant has no claim in the 
present court, having failed to file a permissive cross claim in the first. In short, failure to take a 
permissive action, results in deprivation of any possible remedy. Norton's arguments presumably 
mean that International, who was never served by plaintiff in the first suit, can never be sued also. 
Such an interpretation, if adopted, would violate constitutional principles. The solution to this false 
dilemma created by Norton is obvious. U.R.C.P. 13(f) clearly makes cross-claims permissive, not 
mandatory. Nothing was waived by not bringing the cross-claim in the first suit. Principles of res 
judicata, neither raised nor applicable here, will prevent unnecessary re-litigation of the same issues. 
In this case, there is yet to be litigation of the cases issues. 
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POINT II: THE TORT REFORM ACT CLEARLY CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION 
TO HAVE A PARTY'S PROPORTIONATE FAULT DETERMINED. 
The Tort Reform Act defines in U.C.A.78-27-37, that '"Persons seeking recovery' means 
any person seeking damages or reimbursement on its own behalf . . . ." NSI is seeking 
"reimbursement on its own behalf as specifically authorized by the statute. That phrase has been 
interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain, 853 P2d 877 at 881 (Utah 
1993), to include employers and their insurance carriers, under the Worker's Compensation Act, as 
such persons seeking "reimbursement". Likewise, NSI is seeking reimbursement, as the act 
specifically authorizes. 
Norton is clearly a defendant under the act. Section 78-27-37 states "defendant" means a 
person, ". . . who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking recovery." The 
complaint makes clear the claim that Norton is liable. 
The act also makes clear that any defendant can be joined by any other party to the litigation. 
Section 78-27-41 states "Joinder of Defendants. (1) a person seeking recovery, or any defendant 
who is a party to the litigation, may join as a defendant,. . . any person . . . who may have caused 
or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the purpose of having 
determined their respective proportions of fault." 
The statute is clear. It specifically authorizes NSI, as plaintiff, to be reimbursed by Norton, 
as defendant, for Norton's proportionate fault. The statute's very purpose is " . . . to ensure that 'no 
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault 
attributable to that defendant'" Sullivan, supra, at 880 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38). 
8 
Norton's claim that the courts are now powerless to determine Norton's proportionate fault, because 
NSI did not file a permissive counterclaim in the first suit, abrogates the statute's purpose. 
Norton tries to construe the complaint as seeking contribution, a cause of action under the 
prior statute. The complaint never requests contribution. Instead it specifically cites the Tort 
Reform Statute, and specifically requests that Norton's proportion of fault be determined. The 
current statute has replace contribution, and that statute has been followed. The complaint states 
a claim. 
POINT III: NSPS COMPLAINT ALSO STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST NORTON. 
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft, 758 P2d 443 (Ut. App. 1988), held that, under certain 
circumstances, a upstream manufacturer in a strict liability case, must indemnify the downstream 
distributor not only for a judgment or settlement, but also attorney's fees and costs. Here, Norton 
manufactured the container, and included in its product, as delivered to NSI, the sharp-edged seal 
which struck Mr. Packer's eye. NSI made no alteration of the seal. NSI received the container, 
including the seal, put liquid in the container, precisely as intended by Norton and sold the container 
to Mr. Packer. The Complaint states a claim for indemnification. The breach of Warranty claim 
is similar. 
POINT IV: THE PENDING APPEAL TREATS DIFFERENT ISSUES 
Defendant Norton implies that the appellate court will answer the questions in this case. That 
is not accurate. While the appeal deals with some of the same arguments, the appeal treats whether 
a codefendant can argue against a motion for summary judgment between plaintiff and another 
defendant and whether a defendant's fault should be on the verdict form if the plaintiff does not put 
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up a good faith resistance to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Neither of those 
questions are before this Court. 
The question before this Court is whether cross claims are compulsory, and if not brought 
in a lawsuit between co-defendants are forever waived. The answer to that is clear. The rules of 
civil procedure, both federal and Utah, have never made cross claims compulsory and there are a 
host of reasons for them not being compulsory. Usually, issues of cross claims are resolved in the 
first suit. They would have been resolved in this case had the plaintiff resisted the motion for 
summary judgment. Under unusual circumstances, as here, the statue specifically allows a suit for 
reimbursement, and to have the defendants proportionate fault determined. The complaint states a 
claim. 
Respectfully Submitted, this/vf day of May, 1995. 
POWELL & LANG, LC 
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Exhibit 1 
Factual Background 
Sherman Packer was injured when the seal of a container manufactured by defendant Norton 
exploded into his eye, functionally blinding the eye. The seal was imprinted with the instruction"pry 
out." Plaintiff was following that instruction, and began prying the seal, when it exploded. The 
container was pressurized by altitude and temperature changes- not by NSI's soap which it 
contained. Packer sued NSI (manufacturer of the soap in Norton's container); Norton, who 
manufactured the container; and International who manufactured the seal which Norton incorporated 
into its container. 
International was never served by Packer. Norton moved for summary judgment against 
Packer and Packer's counsel stated he would oppose the summary judgment, and obtained an 
extension to respond. As the extension expired, counsel for Packer decided he would not oppose the 
summary judgment since Packard's counsel did not care whether Norton was a defendant or not, as 
long as Norton's fault could not be determined by the jury. Although plaintiffs counsel indicated 
that he did not respond because he thought Norton's motion had merit (R. p. 20,1. 8-10, p. 21,1. 12-
13) he also frankly acknowledged that the procedural posture did not hurt him. "Frankly, it doesn't 
matter to me. It literally doesn't matter to me. That's why I didn't file a response . . . it literally 
doesn't make any difference to me if it is both of these defendants at trial or one." (R. p. 21,1. 10-
15) "I could have made an opposition, and maybe the outcome would be different." (R. p. 20,1. 4) 
Out of caution, NSI filed an opposing memorandum, within a few days, against the co-defendant. 
NSI argued that: 
1. NSI was not obligated to resist the motion between the plaintiff and a co-defendant; 
2. That NSI did not object to the motion for summary judgment being granted, as long as 
Norton's fault was determined by the jury; 
3. That Norton's fault should be determined by the jury since the case was distinguishable 
from Sullivan v. Scoular Grain, 853 P.2d 877, in that plaintiff declined to resist the summary 
judgment motion. Without good faith resistance, Norton should be granted summary judgment on 
a procedural basis and not because of a "lack of fault" described in Sullivan. 
At the summary judgment hearing, the court in the first suit indicated that it was inclined to 
rule that summary judgment be granted, and NSI's brief ignored since the brief had not been filed 
within the time limits set by the rules. The Court reconsidered its advisory ruling and heard 
argument on the merits when Packard's counsel acknowledged that he had intended to file an 
opposing memorandum, and decided not to at the last minute. NSI twice requested additional time 
to respond to the motion. 
The Court ruled that Norton did not have a duty towards the plaintiff as it was merely a 
"component part manufacturer" and that there was no issue of fact as to Norton's fault. 
During one of several court ordered settlement conferences, which Norton did not attend 
because it had obtained summary judgment, the case was settled. Packer refused to settle for less 
than the full value of the case, and stated he had been fully compensated in the release. Packer 
maintained that he had not resisted Norton's motion for summary judgment, and that any appeal 
would have to be on the part of NSI. Packer agreed that he would cooperate in pursuing the case, 
at NSI's expense, against the other two defendants. 
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